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Interest in the private provision of infrastructure has been increas-
ing in recent years. The Bush Administration’s proposed fiscal year 1991
budget document, for example, touted a proposed private toll road in
Virginia as an example of the kind of creative public/private partnership
needed to address the nation’s transportation problems. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has launched a major initiative de-
signed to foster public/private partnerships in environmental infrastruc-
ture, such as water and wastewater treatment plants. Proposals to sell
airports to the private sector have been seriously discussed in Los
Angeles, Albany, and Peoria.
The increased interest in privatization is driven by a number of
factors. A primary motivation is the belief that the private sector is
inherently more efficient than the public sector and can therefore build
and operate facilities at less cost than the public sector. Also, the public
sector, facing increased taxpayer resistance, may simply be unable to
finance facilities that the private sector would be willing and able to
undertake for a profit. Privatization proponents contend that federal tax
laws have often distorted decision-making to favor the public sector in
the provision of infrastructure.
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This paper explores the prospects for the privatization of infrastruc-
ture by examining two categories of infrastructure: toll roads and solid
waste disposal facilities. Both are capital intensive, but in the United
States they historically have had different levels of private sector
involvement. Roads, although normally built by private contractors, are
typically planned, owned, and operated by state transportation depart-
ments or state authorities. By contrast, the private sector has historically
been a major owner and operator of solid waste disposal facilities such
as landfills and, more recently, resource recovery plants. Furthermore,
in solid waste the structure and role of private industry has substantially
changed in the last two decades.
Missing Dimensions in the Privatization Debate
The current debate over the potential cost advantages of the private
sector and the concurrent attempts to modify the federal tax code to
encourage privatization (or at least level the playing field for the private
sector), while certainly relevant, may also divert attention from other
major dimensions of the privatization decision. First, while the private
sector may be able to build facilities faster and operate them at lower
cost, particularly when competition is present or potentially available,
cost is neither the only important barrier to infrastructure provision nor
the only consideration in the choice between public and private provid-
ers. Local neighborhood and environmental opposition to the siting of
new roads or solid waste facilities, for example, is often as much of a bar
to infrastructure investment as cost. Although the presence of a private
operator can change the dynamics of such siting processes, it is unclear
whether the private sector offers any major advantages, in siting.
Additionally, siting, equity, and other considerations may lead to direct
or indirect public regulation of the prices charged by private operators,
particularly in situations where private operators do not face much
competition. The regulation, as well as the regulatory process itself,
could conceivably undermine many of the advantages of private in-
volvement in infrastructure provision. At any rate, the total advantages
of the two options, public or private, must be weighed, rather than
simply construction, operating, or financial costs.
The debate over the cost advantages of privatization also often fails
to distinguish between those savings that are net efficiency gains to
society as a whole and those that represent transfers from one sector of
society to another. The debate over the federal tax code and financing
costs commonly focuses only on the net return that must be paid
investors, for example, without considering the extent to which federal
taxpayers win or lose under either public or private financing or the costTHE PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 145
to state or local taxpayers of the equity they often contribute to public
projects.
To investigate these issues, this paper first reviews the evolution of
private sector involvement in the provision of highways and solid waste
disposal facilities in the United States. The advantages of the public and
private sectors are then compared, not only for the conventional
concerns of costs and financing but also for the often neglected dimen-
sions of siting, pricing, and government regulation. In this discussion,
an attempt is also made to distinguish the net efficiency savings of
privatization from the transfers. Finally, an overall assessment is offered
of who wins and who loses from privatization as well as the circum-
stances under which privatization might prove an attractive public
policy.
Trends in the Privatization of Roads and Solid Waste
Interest in privately owned and operated toll roads has undergone
a revival recently in the United States, after being a rare phenomenon
for 100 years or more. By contrast, private toll roads have been
comparatively common in Europe for the last two decades. The best
known example is the cross-channel tunnel (using auto on rail) now
being built by a private Anglo-French consortium. Nine-tenths of the
expressways in Italy are privately owned and operated, as are a
significant portion of the expressways in Spain and France.1 In most
cases these private roads are based on a "build-operate-transfer" model
under which the private firm builds the facility, operates it for twenty-
five to forty years, and then transfers title and control back to the public.
Although private toll roads are not without historical precedent in
the United States, virtually all of the U.S. highway system is publicly
owned and operated today. The few exceptions include approximately a
dozen bridges over major rivers in rural areas; these are either special
development promotions of local business groups or historical remnants
of the more extensive private toll road system of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. Other exceptions include private toll roads
inside major resorts built by a single developer, such as "Seventeen Mile
Drive" in the Carmel, California development owned by Del Monte
Properties or the road through the Avery Island Resort in Louisiana
(U.So Federal Highway Administration 1987).
1 See Poole (1988, p. 509). Many of these European private toll roads, it should be
noted, receive some public assistance in the form of equity investments, low-interest
loans, or tax benefits; see European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1990, pp.
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Publicly owned and operated toll-road initiatives are also relatively
rare in the United States, although this also was not always the case. The
Northeastern states embarked on an extensive program of building
publicly owned toll expressways in the late 1930s. This lasted, except for
wartime interruption, into the early 1950s. By 1956, toll-road enthusiasts
could boast that one could drive from New York to Chicago without
stopping for a single traffic light: but, of course, one did have to stop for
several toll booths (Rae 1971, pp. 171-183). The construction of tolled
public highways fell off sharply after 1954 when Congress authorized
construction of the 42,000-mile Interstate and Defense Highway System
on which tolls were largely forbidden. The only major exceptions,
undertaken as a compromise to capture Northeastern political support,
were 2,447 miles of pre-Interstate toll expressways incorporated into the
Interstate System. The remaining 40,000 miles or so of Interstate
highways were 90 percent financed by grants from the federal govern-
ment (raised, in turn, by increased federal excise taxes on motor fuels
and vehicles) and 10 percent by the states (raised largely from state fuel
taxes).
The Revival of Private Toll Roads
The recent revival of interest in both tolls and private highway
provision was stimulated in large part by government budgetary pres-
sures. While the Interstate System is largely complete, federal funds can
still be used to widen existing Interstate routes. Congress has not agreed
to expand the eligible Interstate route network, however, which hurts
the unserved areas that have experienced growth in the thirty-six years
since the Interstate System was designed. Federal aid remains available
for some non-Interstate roads, as are the states’ own tax revenues. But
in many fast-growth areas, such as the South, the West, and the
outlying suburbs of major metropolitan areas, the growth in traffic has
been so rapid that available public funds seem inadequate.
Of the 902 miles of new toll road projects that are now being
planned in seventeen states, most would be publicly owned and
operated.2 In 1987 Congress relaxed its ban on the use of federal aid for
publicly owned toll highways and authorized seven demonstration toll
road projects (two more were added in 1988) on which up to 35 percent
federal funding could be used to match toll receipts.3 The State of Texas
2 Estimates from the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association cited in
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1989, p. 172).
3 Prior to this Congress had authorized some specific exceptions to the prohibition on
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completed one of the first of the new crop of public toll roads without
federal aid in 1987, an expressway on the outskirts of Houston, and is
scheduled to open a second in 1990. The State of Colorado has
established a public authority to build a new fifty-mile toll road on the
eastern fringe of Denver. California created a similar authority to build
three toll roads in Orange County, and Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Georgia are participating in the federal demonstration project. In several
of these cases private landowners or developers along the route are
donating rights-of-way to help make the projects financially feasible, but
the facilities will remain under the control of state and local govern-
ments.
Of the several serious proposals for private toll roads that have
emerged in the last few years, the most advanced is the Toll Road
Corporation of Virginia (TRCV) proposal to build a fifteen-mile private
toll road connecting Dulles Airport with Leesburg, Virginia.4 The private
road would be a western extension of the present state-owned Dulles
Toll Road, which connects the airport and nearby communities with one
of Washington’s circumferential beltways. The State of Virginia and
Loudoun County have already, approved the extension’s alignment,
although they still must review the detailed roadway and structure
designs and the State Corporation Commission has not yet approved
the financial plan and the proposed toll rates. If the financial plan and
rates are approved in the summer of 1990, the TRCV hopes to begin
construction soon after and open the road by March 1993.
In 1989, the California legislature passed a law allowing private
companies to build up to four privately funded, for~profit toll roads,
bridges, and tunnels in the state over the next ten years. Ten consortia
of private construction and finance companies have been qualified to
propose projects. The state’s present schedule calls for conceptual
proposals to be submitted by August 1, 1990 and for the state to select
the four best and sign exclusive development agreements by the end of
the year. Among the schemes being discussed are a new San Francisco
Bay bridge and the double-decking of a thirty-mile stretch of an existing
Los Angeles freeway.
Proposals have emerged in other states as well, although they are
either less advanced than Virginia’s or on a less ambitious schedule than
California’s. In Colorado, the private Front Range Toll Road Company
exempted, however, mainly toll bridges, tunnels, and approach roads to the Interstate
System. See Sandlin (1989, pp. 49-50).
4 In addition to the private toll road proposals, one private toll bridge has already been
constructed. The $2 million bridge, which opened in June 1988, connects Fargo, North
Dakota with Moorehead, Minnesota and was developed after voters had rejected a special
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has proposed to build and operate a 210-mile toll highway between
Pueblo and Fort Collins. The States of Illinois and Missouri are in the
preliminary stages of evaluating the feasibility of a 400-mile private toll
road between Chicago and Kansas City.
The Evolution of Private Solid Waste Disposal
Solid waste disposal was mainly the responsibility of private citi-
zens and scavengers until the mid-1800s, when the emergence of large
industrial cities greatly increased urban waste problems.5 Many cities
responded by assuming the responsibility for the collection and disposal
of waste. A 1913 survey of 25 major cities conducted by the Civil Service
Commission of Chicago found a variety of waste disposal practices and
a variety of public/private relationships for waste collection and disposal
(Hering and Greeley 1921, p. 106). At that time, labor was the largest
disposal cost because cheap land was available near the city and waste
disposal systems were relatively simple.
Disposal practices changed little through most of the first half of the
twentieth century. However, many cities stopped contracting out for
waste collection and disposal just before and after World War I, an
outgrowth of the Progressive movement which believed that providing
services publicly would reduce opportunities for graft and mismanage-
ment. After World War II a number of cities began contracting out again,
in part because they wanted to avoid the high costs of collection
equipment and the political difficulties of siting waste disposal facilities.6
Both public and private operators generally disposed of garbage in open
dumps or burned it at incinerators.
The rise of the environmental movement in the late 1960s dramat-
ically changed waste disposal practices and, in the process, transformed
private waste disposal from a labor-intensive industry made up of many
small firms into a capital-intensive industry, dominated by a handful of
giants. Emissions limits from the 1970 Clean Air Act forced many
communities to close their incinerators. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), passed in 1976, established strict controls over
the design and operation of landfills, required separate hazardous waste
disposal facilities, and encouraged the development of resource recov-
ery facilities. Drafters of the bill believed that by increasing the cost of
landfills, they would make resource recovery a more viable option,
s For an excellent history of solid waste disposal in the United States, see Melosi
(1981).
6 Telephone interview with Rita Knorr, Director of Research, American Public Works
Association, May 14, 1990.THE PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 149
particularly if energy prices continued to rise (Clunie 1987, pp. 2-4). The
Public Utilities and Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 made
prospects for waste-to-energy plants even more attractive by requiring
utilities to buy energy from the plants if their costs are lower than the
long-run marginal costs of providing power from new utility facilities.
As a result of stricter standards in RCRA, more than 70 percent of
the approximately 14,000 landfills operating in 1978 were closed by 1988
(National Solid Wastes Management Association 1990, p. 7). In 1988,
EPA estimated that about 40 percent of the remaining 6,000 or so
landfills then operating would have to close by the mid-1990s (National
Solid Wastes Management Association 1989a, p. 3). Concerns about
groundwater pollution, odors, and increased traffic stymie the siting of
new landfills. Resource recovery plants, which burn waste for energy,
sometimes after sorting the incoming stream for recyclables, raise
similar fears plus additional concerns about toxic air emissions and the
disposal of the potentially toxic ash the facilities generate. As a result,
the nation is closing landfills at a faster rate than the added capacity
through new landfills and resource recovery plants. At the same time,
the need for even more capacity continues to grow.
The stringent technological requirements for new facilities have also
dramatically increased the cost of developing and operating waste
disposal facilities. The National Solid Wastes Management Association
estimates that the cost of constructing a landfill (above and beyond land
acquisition) has risen from $200,000 per acre of capacity in 1975 to $1
million an acre in 1990. Environmental management requirements add
another $210,000 an acre (1989a, p. 4). Tipping fees (the name given to
the fees charged by landfill or waste recovery plant operators), which
had averaged only a few dollars a ton, have risen dramatically to both
cover higher costs and reflect the increasing scarcity of disposal capacity.
All these changes mean that more and more political and techno-
logical sophistication and capital are required to build and operate waste
processing facilities. In conjunction with the potential for large profits,
these changes have revolutionized the industry. A 1970 survey located
more than 10,000 waste disposal firms, most of them small family
businesses; their total revenue was less than $1 billion (Wingerter 1990,
pp. 282-84). In the following two decades, a few large national firms
were created, primarily through the purchase of the small local compa-
nies. In just one year, for example, Browning-Ferris Industries, one of
the largest waste disposal firms in the country, bought 131 small garbage
collection businesses ("Mr. Clean .... " 1990). As a result of such
consolidation, private landfills are now dominated by a few major
companies, most notably Browning-Ferris, Waste Management, Laid-
law Waste Systems, Attwoods PLC, Western Waste Industries, and
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in even fewer hands with two firms, Ogden Martin Systems and
Wheelabrator, accounting for close to 45 percent of the business (Cook
1988, p. 102). For both hazardous and solid waste, these companies are
estimated to have annual revenues in excess of $8 billion (Wingerter
1990, p. 282).
The private firms operate under a variety of scenarios. At the risk of
some simplification, private waste disposal is done on either a contract
or a merchant basis. In the first case, a private firm agrees to design,
build, and operate a plant for one or several municipal governments.
The contract fixes the tipping fee per ton (often with provisions for
inflation) and guarantees a minimum volume of waste to be delivered.
The public sector often assists or takes responsibility for siting. Actual
ownership, private or public, is usually dictated by advantages offered
by the tax laws in effect when the plant is built. Under the usual
contractual scheme, the private company absorbs the risk that the plant
will work correctly and can be built and operated within budget, while
the public sector absorbs the risk that open-market tipping fees might
decline or local trash volumes fall below contract minimums. Many
communities choose the contract route because they are not prepared to
build or operate today’s technologically sophisticated disposal technol-
ogies and they do not want to be exposed to the risk of ever-increasing
tipping fees.7
The merchant plant, by contrast, is generally built and operated
without prearranged public or private clients and without siting assis-
tance. These facilities, however, are free to charge whatever the market
will bear for waste disposal. In terms of risks, merchant plants are closer
to toll roads than contract plants, since the merchant plant operator
assumes not only the risks of whether the technology will work and can
be brought in under budget, but also the risks of fluctuations in market
demand or prices.
Some communities remain wary of relying on private solid waste
firms, whether on a contract or merchant basis. Many have instead
banded together to form special districts to build and operate their own
public waste disposal facilities. These districts can give communities
some of the economies of scale exploited by the large firms emerging in
the private sector.
On the whole, considerations of cost, risk, and expertise seem to be
making the private sector an increasingly major player in solid waste
disposal. More than half the cities surveyed in a recent American Public
Works Research Foundation study rely on private waste disposal (1990).
7 Another risk communities often seek to avoid is the fluctuation in the prices utilities
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Although private landfills represent only 14 percent of the total number
in the country, they contain about half of the nation’s existing disposal
space. In addition, almost half of the nation’s resource recovery plants
are privately owned.8 Whether these trends continue will, in large part,
be driven not only by issues of efficiency and cost, but also by siting
ability and regulation.
The Conventional Concerns: Cost and Financing
A common argument in favor of privatization is that private
involvement will help alleviate the infrastructure crisis by increasing the
total investment in infrastructure and the quality of the projects se-
lected. Privatization might increase infrastructure investment above the
levels possible with limited public budgets by tapping a new source of
funds: the private capital markets. And as Robert Poole (1989), one of
the leading proponents of privatization, argues, "When projects must
meet [private] investors’ rate of return expectations, only economically
sound, high-priority projects are likely to get selected."
Aggregate Investment and Project Selection
While private involvement might increase total infrastructure
spending, privatization does nothing (at least directly) to increase the
pool of private savings from which private capital markets must draw;
therefore privately financed infrastructure is likely to displace some
other investment. Publicly provided infrastructure, by contrast, at least
has some possibility of increasing total investments made by society (in
infrastructure and all else), to the extent that the public programs are
funded by current user charges9 or taxes rather than by debt, and these
charges or taxes are borne (at least in part) by a reduction of private
consumption rather than private saving. Privatization would offer an
advantage, then, only if there were little chance of increasing public
funding and if the additional infrastructure investment were more
worthwhile than the investments it displaced.
Private investment is also no guarantee against economically un-
sound infrastructure projects, since private investors may be perfectly
willing to invest in unsound projects if the construction of those projects
8 Government Advisory Associates, Resource Recovery Yearbook (New York: 1986-1987),
p. 72 as cited in NSWMA 1989b, p. 5.
9 In other words, if user charges are employed to pay capital expenses on a current or
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is linked with implicit or explicit public subsidies or guarantees. Some
governments have attempted to reduce this risk by specifying that
privatization receive no government subsidies. California’s Department
of Transportation has announced, for example, that no public subsidies
will be granted to private highway projects; presumably in California
these projects must depend entirely on toll proceeds or revenues from
other private ancillary activities, such as the development of adjacent
land owned by the private road company or its financial backers.10
State and local governments may believe that some infrastructure
projects warrant public subsidies because they generate important social
and economic benefits that are not easily captured by private (or public)
operators. A private toll road might reduce congestion on parallel
untolled roads, for example, and rural expressways might provide
important social benefits by stimulating the development of promising
but otherwise undeveloped areas (much as the western railroads were
thought to have done in the previous century) or areas with laggard
economies and high unemployment rates. A recent financial analysis of
the proposed Kansas City to Chicago private toll road commissioned by
the States of Illinois and Missouri, for example, concluded that toll
proceeds would be inadequate to fund the road and recommended that
the two states purchase the rights-of-way for the private operator with
proceeds from special tax assessments on neighboring land, in the
expectation that the road will stimulate development (Price Waterhouse
1990).
Subsidies to private companies might receive closer scrutiny, of
course, simply because the companies are private and not public.
Nevertheless, as long as public officials believe, for better or worse, that
the social benefits of some infrastructure projects are real or warrant
public subsidy, that enhances the possibility that some unwise or
unsound projects might be built, whether publicly or privately. In a
sense, that risk is the unfortunate reverse of the possibility of the
subsidies enabling some worthwhile projects that might otherwise be
ignored.
Cost or Technical Efficiency
The most commonly cited advantage of private operators is that
they can build and operate infrastructure facilities at lower cost than
their public sector counterparts. Numerous studies of the relative costs
10 If these ancillary revenues are more readily captured by private but not public
projects, then private projects may have an advantage. This advantage is not likely to stem
from a real saving in resources to society, however, as we shall explain later.THE PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 153
of public and private services suggest that private operations do cost
less, as long as competition is present to ensure that the private
operators remain efficient.1~ Most of these studies deal with labor-
intensive services, such as garbage collection or building maintenance,
however, with few careful studies of capital-intensive services.~2 As a
result, any comparison of private and public infrastructure costs must
rest to a considerable extent on a subjective assessment of the claims of
various supporters and detractors, with only limited empirical evidence
for guidance.
Some of the cost advantages claimed by proponents of privatization
are also clearly transfers from one group to another rather than real
savings in resources for the economy as a whole. Private companies may
be able to pay lower wage rates than public authorities, for example,
although this will not always be allowed. (California has specified that
private toll road builders must pay the same prevailing union wages as
public authorities are required to pay.) Lower wage rates would reduce
the budgetary costs of the project, but (absent productivity differentials)
would not reduce the amount of labor resources required. Of course, to
the extent that the lower factor prices paid by private vendors were
closer to "true" free market prices, as presumably they often would be,
then a more efficient combination of factors should be achieved by the
private than by the public sector. In short, working with "better" factor
price signals, the private supplier should be more productive than a
public sector counterpart, all else equal.
Similarly, landowners and developers may be more likely to donate
rights-of-way to private than to public road projects. Most of the land for
the Dulles Toll Road Extension, for example, would be donated by
neighboring landowners who stand to benefit. Landowners often do-
nate land to public projects as well, where donations might encourage
public highway authorities to give the road project higher priority.
Nevertheless, the threat that the project might not survive without
donations may be more credible where a private rather than a public
operator is involved. But whether the project is public or private,
donations of land represent a transfer from landowners to road users or
investors, and generally do not reduce the total land required for the
~ John D. Donahue, in reviewing these comparative cost studies, concludes that the
critical factor is not the form of ownership but the presence of competitive markets.
"Public versus private matters, but competitive versus non-competitive usually matters
more," he writes (1989, p. 76).
~2 One exception is the literature on the comparative costs of publicly and privately
owned electric, gas, and water utilities. There is no consensus in these studies as to which
form of ownership has lower costs. The privately owned utilities are usually publicly
regulated, however, and public regulation can reduce the potential efficiency advantages
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project. Furthermore, if the land input is fixed, then no productivity
gain would be expected even if the private sector faced more realistic
market prices for land.
While many private sector "savings" may simply be transfers,
private firms do appear to have a number of real cost advantages. These
are created in part by the incentives provided by the profit motive, in
part by avoidance of some cumbersome public sector bidding and
contracting requirements, and in part by achieving efficiencies of scale,
scope, and experience that might elude public operators. Private oper-
ators, for example, may have a stronger incentive and more flexibility to
use resources, such as labor, productively. Comparisons of labor-
intensive public and private services, such as garbage collection, often
show that private firms have higher labor productivity than public
agencies because they have more freedom to structure compensation,
promotion, and other incentives to encourage worker productivity and
are less constrained by cumbersome workrules.13 While no comparative
studies of productivity are available for waste disposal or roads; these
industries probably offer similar opportunities. Some private landfill
operators, for example, reportedly use their sites and labor more
efficiently by giving managers and employees strong incentives to
compact trash more thoroughly and to grade and cover it more
carefully.14
Private firms may also achieve real cost savings by building facilities
more quickly. The public sector generally plans, designs, bids, and
builds major facilities such as roads in a sequential process, completing
each stage before starting the next. Private firms may have more
flexibility to use design-build or fast-track parallel processes, in which
design engineers and private contractors are selected simultaneously
and the planning, designing, bidding, and construction phases overlap.
By using such an approach, for example, proponents of the private
Dulles Toll Road Extension assert that they can plan, receive approval
for, finance, and build a road several years faster than the Virginia
Department of Transportation. 15 The use of such procedures need not be
13 In a comparison of public and private provision of eight different labor-intensive
services, for example, Barbara Stevens found that the cost savings stemmed in large
measure from higher labor productivity and not just from lower wage rates in seven out
of the eight cases (1984, pp. 395-406).
14 Interview with Ronald Jensen, Director of Public Works, City of Phoenix, Arizona,
April 19, 1990, at Cambridge, Mass.
is Lauren Waiters, chief operating officer of the Toll Road Corporation of Virginia,
claims that their company can plan and build a road in four to five years while the public
sector would take at least six to eight years to build a similar facility. The history of the
Dulles Toll Road Extension, however, so far has been marked by delays from the
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limited to the private sector, of course, but faster construction would
save on the capital required for a project by bringing the investment into
service more quickly.16
Most intriguing is the possibility that the private sector may be
better able to exploit economies of scale, scope, and experience than the
public sector. For example, building or operating plants in a variety of
locations, private firms may be able to achieve greater specialization of
labor by hiring experts in specialized technical or managerial areas while
smaller public agencies often must hire generalists who will oversee a
number of such areas. Multiple plant operation may also allow the
private operator to achieve economies in administrative or overhead
functions and to offer staff more opportunities and incentives for career
advancement (thereby enabling the recruitment of a better work force at
less cost, all else equal). Private operators may also be better positioned
to exploit their experience, or the learning curve, because by building
larger plants or building plants more often, they do not have to learn
about the practical and technological problems anew each time.
Many of these advantages appear to have contributed to the rapid
growth in the last two decades of large waste disposal firms. Increasing
technological complexity has undoubtedly made economies of scope
and experience more important in waste disposal. But some of these
same advantages appear to be present in road construction as well,
which is also dominated by large firms, particularly for major road
projects with sophisticated design or engineering problems. If private
toll roads became more common, large companies might emerge that
managed as well as built roads, much as is the case in solid waste
disposal.
The public sector may encounter difficulties in achieving these
economies of scope and experience on its own (or, more precisely,
without contracting with the private sector). Even banding together on
a regional basis, for example, local communities are unlikely to build or
operate more than one large waste recovery plant or landfill every ten or
twenty years. The public sector’s appreciation of these potential econo-
mies is reflected in the near universal practice of contracting with private
firms to construct complex infrastructure facilities (even when they are
road would be open in the fall of 1991, but that schedule has been extended several times
and the latest forecast (as of May 1990) is for the road to open in March of 1993. These
delays are due in part to public regulatory oversight, however, which will be discussed
later in this paper. Testimony of Lauren Waiters of the Toll Road Corporation of Virginia,
"Supplemental Testimony and Exhibits in Response to State Corporation Commission,"
May 2, 1990, pp. 10-13 and exhibits.
16 The public sector could of course use similar procedures. For example, many states
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publicly owned) and the growing practice of contracting for private
management as well, particularly in the case of solid waste.
The Financing Issue
In the early 1980s, private firms providing infrastructure could issue
debt through both government and industrial revenue bonds, whose
interest payments were exempt from federal individual income taxes.
The 1981 federal tax bill also gave generous depreciation allowances and
investment tax credits to investors in privately owned infrastructure. In
a sharp reversal of policy, however, the federal tax bill of 1986 restricted
the use of tax-exempt bonds to finance privately owned projects and
eliminated many of the accelerated depreciation allowances and invest-
ment tax credits.17
Privatization proponents contend that private firms are now unable
to compete fairly with the public sector because public entities have
access to tax-exempt debt while private firms do not. As a result, some
privatization proponents have argued for changes in the tax code to
make the private sector more competitive with the public sector, either
by giving the private sector access to tax-exempt debt for public purpose
projects or by giving the private Sector generous depreciation allow-
ances.
The debate over the tax treatment of public and private financing
seemingly has little to do with efficiency as economists conventionally
define it. Efficiency would be involved only if the choice between public
and private financing affected either the total amount of capital required
or the degree or nature of the risks involved in the infrastructure project.
Neither of these factors is likely to be affected substantially by the choice
of public or private financing per se. However, public or private fi-
nancing may affect the nominal financing costs to the investors by
transferring some of the financing costs to other parties, such as federal
or state taxpayers.18
Privatization proponents may be wrong, moreover, in arguing that
17 Exceptions were limited to some energy-producing facilities, including resource
recovery plants and a few other very special circumstances.
~ It is conceivable that private financing might typically require less capital because
private ventures use a combination of debt and equity while some public ventures are
financed entirely out of debt. The use of some equity might reduce total capital
requirements if bondholders in 100 percent debt-financed projects required that more
capital be tied up in the form of higher debt reserves or coverage ratios. It would be
difficult to determine whether or not this was the case and, in any event, the advantages
(if any) do not depend on tax laws or even public or private financing per se but only on
the willingness of the investors (whether public or private) to use equity for a portion of
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even the nominal financing costs to private investors are much higher
than those to public investors under the current tax laws. 19 On the one
hand, the public agency can issue debt whose interest is exempt from
federal individual income taxes, which reduces the nominal interest
rates the public agency must pay. On the other hand, interest payments
on a private company’s debt are a deductible business expense, which
reduces corporate income taxes the company pays, presuming it is
profitable. Even if the private company is not profitable (as is the case in
the early years for many long-lived, capital-intensive projects), the
company may be able to get another profitable company to build or buy
the facility and then lease it back, thereby effectively capturing (in the
lower lease payments) a portion of the tax advantages derived from the
deductibility of interest. These tax advantages of public and private debt
may be roughly equivalent, given that the present marginal rates for
federal individual and corporate income taxes are approximately the
same (28 and 34 percent, respectively), Indeed, for the past several years
the yield on A-rated municipal tax exempt bonds has been higher than
the after-tax cost of A-rated corporate bonds (Gurwitz 1989, p. M3).
Nevertheless, it seems that if two projects, one private and one public,
were otherwise identical (and in particular generated the same cash
throw-off before interest, taxes, and all book charges such as deprecia-
tion), the chances of collecting income taxes from the private vendor’s
cash flow would be much greater; state and local government operating
entities not only can issue tax-exempt debt but also are largely tax
exempt on their own operating earnings, whether paid out or retained.
The nominal financing costs may also sometimes appear lower for
public than private projects, either because the public sector is able to
borrow a higher portion of the project costs or because it uses some
public equity on which it requires little or no return. In the former case,
while the average interest rates may be lower in the public than the
private case, the total financing costs may not be, because revenue
bondholders often will require larger coverage ratios or debt reserves for
projects with little equity (which, in turn, increases the total amount of
capital that must be financed). In the latter case, financing costs may also
be comparable to those of the private sector if the public equity (which
is sometimes provided, for example, by paying for project planning,
design, and engineering costs out of general government budgets) is
properly valued and is accorded a fair return on its opportunity cost.
To the extent that the nominal costs of public and private financing
do differ, it is usually only because some transfers are effected between
Many of the arguments in the following two paragraphs have been made by
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the facility’s investors or users and other parties. If the nominal cost of
public debt is lower than private debt under current tax laws and market
conditions, then the use of public rather than private debt will simply
transfer some burden to the federal taxpayer (and the state taxpayer as
well, in an area with state corporate income taxes). In essence, tax
realizations will be reduced to the extent that the total amount of tax
shields has been increased in the economy. The tax loss commonly will
be captured either by investors, in the form of higher returns, or by
facility users, in the form of lower tolls or tipping fees. If nominal public
financing costs are also lower because the public agency contributes
equity which is undervalued or earns no return, then the state or local
taxpayer loses (from not receiving a fair return on that equity) while the
facility user usually benefits (in lower tolls or tipping fees).
All these issues are illustrated by the Dulles Toll Road Extension. At
the time of its initial (1990) application to the Virginia State Corporation
Commission, the private toll road corporation proposed to build the
road for $199 million and then sell it to another private company that
could take advantage of the tax benefits.2° The other private company
would lease the road back to the toll road company for payments with
an equivalent cost of 10 percent interest. The toll road corporation would
contribute $30 million in equity needed to cover losses in the early years
(when lease payments plus operating expenses would exceed toll
revenues because of the slow build-up of traffic). On its 15 percent
equity stake the toll road corporation projects an average annual pre-tax
return of 20 percent, so the total financing cost (lease plus equity) would
average around 12 percent per year. The private toll road corporation
plans to charge a toll of $1.50 per car for the first eighteen months of
operation, with toll rates rising in two increments thereafter to reach $2
per car three and one-half years after opening.
The Virginia Department of Transportation’s (VDOT) counterpro-
posal is to build the toll road as a public facility for a cost of $236 million,
with much of the higher cost apparently due to the public authority
paying for some of the land that would be donated by landowners to the
private corporation. VDOT proposes to finance the project by issuing
$218 million in tax-exempt debt and $18 million in surplus toll revenues
generated by the existing state-owned Dulles Toll Road. VDOT also
believes the state would need a $70 million line of credit at 7.5 percent
interest to cover early-year operating deficits and debt coverage require-
20 The public proposal is as described in hearings before the Virginia State Corporation
Commission and summarized in Commonwealth of Virginia, State Corporation Commis-
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ments. VDOT proposes to charge a toll of only $1 per car, which would
not be raised over the life of the project.
Putting aside the issue of whether the private company’s and
VDOT’s cost estimates and timetables are realistic (which both parties
dispute), the possible substitution of 7 to 8 percent public debt for the 10
percent private debt implicit in the lease payments would represent a
transfer from federal and state taxpayers (in lower individual and
Corporate income tax payments) to road users (in the form of lower
tolls). The possible substitution of $30 million in private equity at 20
percent for $18 million in public equity (in the form of the excess
revenues on the existing road) with no apparent return also represents
a transfer from a combination of federal and state taxpayers (in the form
of the forgone return on the state’s equity and, to lesser extent, lower
federal and state corporate income taxes) to road users (in lower tolls).
Indeed, if VDOT charged the same tolls as the private company
proposes, it would earn approximately the same return on its equity (20
percent) as the private company is projecting. Put another way, if VDOT
acknowledged that the risks of its project were similar to those of the
private proposal and therefore required a similar return on its equity, it
would have to charge approximately the same tolls.
The Dulles Toll Road Extension raises other issues besides financing
costs. The private company claims that VDOT cannot build the road as
fast or as cheaply as it can, for example, while VDOT argues that the
private cost estimates and construction timetable are unrealistic and that
VDOT will enjoy some operating and toll collection economies from
operating the extension as well as the existing toll road. The case
illustrates, however, that the nominal costs of financing may not be so
different if the private company uses leases and other devices to take full
advantage of tax shelters and if the public equity is properly compen-
sated. To the extent that nominal financing costs differ and all else is
equal, moreover, the differential represents largely transfers rather than
real cost savings to society.
Additional Considerations: Siting, Pricing, and
Regulation
Some of the cost advantages of the private sector may be offset if
extensive public oversight and regulation of private siting or pricing
decisions are required. Siting infrastructure facilities is often at least as
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The Siting Problem
In the case of highways, new facilities are sometimes welcomed as
spurs to development, particularly in rural or outlying areas. But these
cases may now be the exception rather than the rule, as each decade has
added new sources of concern and opposition, and new government
regulations controlling highway siting decisions. Land assembly for
highways has always been difficult if only because a long continuous
right-of-way is required, and governments have usually had to resort to
condemnation proceedings, which are governed by constitutional and
other safeguards.
By the 1960s, neighborhoods in the path of new highways learned
to mobilize politically, and their opposition eventually led to the
cancellation of some of the proposed inner-city extensions of the
Interstate System in major metropolitan areas and to federal require-
ments that highway planners provide relocation assistance and consider
"no build" and mass transit alternatives to federally aided highways. By
the 1970s, concerns about the destruction of parks and sensitive envi-
ronmental areas and automobile air pollution led the federal govern-
ment and many states to require environmental reviews and public
hearings on highway and other major project proposals. The 1980s
brought a renewed concern that new highways would stimulate too
much development, particularly in suburban areas where growing
traffic congestion and development densities seemed to threaten the
quality of life many residents had moved to the suburbs to enjoy. The
highway extensions now being planned in most major metropolitan
areas are located on the outermost periphery, where neighborhood and
environmental opposition is generally less intense and development is
more likely to be welcome.21
Opposition to the siting of solid waste facilities is based on similar
concerns. A landfill or waste recovery plant does not require a contin-
uous right-of-way, so condemnation may not be as necessary. But such
facilities have long generated neighborhood opposition because of
heavy truck traffic and, more recently, fears of groundwater contamina-
tion or air pollution. Local community dumps and municipal incinera-
tors are increasingly being replaced by large regional facilities because
environmental regulations have increased the technological complexity
and minimum efficient scale of disposal facilities. These larger facilities
intensify the feeling of nearby local groups that they are being unfairly
singled out to bear regional costs and risks, and strengthen the now
familiar "not in my back yard" (NIMBY) syndrome.
21 For a description of the evolution of public concerns and government regulations
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Private ownership or operation does not eliminate the pressures or
opportunities for government oversight or public involvement in siting
decisions. Private facilities will typically require zoning or other local
permits as well as state and federal environmental approvals and other
related requirements. In the case of the Dulles Toll Road Extension, for
example, Virginia’s Commonwealth Transportation Board had to pass
on the "public need" for the project and approve the alignment; both
Loudoun County and the Virginia Department of Transportation must
still approve the final roadway and interchange designs. The Dulles Toll
Road may need Loudoun County to exercise eminent domain on its
behalf as well since, although most of the right-of-way is being donated,
the owners of a few parcels are still holding out. Such permits and
approvals give affected governments and citizens a variety of opportu-
nities and grounds to modify, delay, or conceivably stop private
projects.
Private firms may have some advantages over public agencies in
resolving these siting problems, however, such as the ability to avoid
the public spotlight until relatively late in the siting process, after many
of the concerns of local residents and government regulations have been
resolved. For example, a private waste disposal firm in Phoenix was able
to negotiate agreements with surrounding property owners and meet
with state environmental regulators before the site of their proposed
new landfill became public knowledge, so that by the time the required
public hearings on environmental impacts were eventually held, many
of those who initially might have been opposed were already supporters
of the proposal.22 In contrast, a public agency is more likely to have to
conduct a search for a new site openly from the start, so that local
opposition have more chance to become mobilized and intransigent
before their concerns can be met.
Private firms also may have more flexibility than public agencies in
the compensation they offer objectors, or they may be more skilled both
in marketing the benefits and minimizing the risks of proposed projects.
Private solid waste firms are increasingly seeking out poor and thinly
populated counties as host communities for landfills, and compensating
these communities with a share of the tipping fees, new deep wells and
water supply systems for surrounding houses, and new neighborhood
facilities such as parks, golf courses, and even a baseball stadium (Katz
1990). Public agencies can adopt the same practices, of course, and have
in some cases. Some local public authorities have recognized that large
profits may be made in opening their landfills to other communities, for
example, especially in the Northeast where tipping fees are high. Still,
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more parties will be involved in the negotiation and agreement may be
more difficult if, instead of a single private firm, a consortium of
neighboring communities must initiate and approve the compensation
plan for the host community or a local city council must design the
compensation scheme for its immediate neighbors.
These potential siting advantages of private firms, nevertheless,
may be offset by disadvantages, such as public apprehensions that
private firms will not take their environmental and other community
responsibilities seriously. Mistrust is probably more of a problem for
solid waste than for highways, both because the environmental risks are
perceived to be greater and because the solid waste industry suffers,
fairly or not, from past associations with organized crime, price fixing,
and environmental neglect.23 The degree of public mistrust has led one
of the dominant private waste recovery firms, Ogden, to specialize in
building and operating plants under contract to municipal authorities
rather than merchant plants for the spot market. Ogden has managed to
site more new plants than its nearest competitor, Wheelabrator, be-
cause, in acting as the agent for municipalities, Ogden is less vulnerable
to attacks from environmentalists and those who simply do not want a
plant nearby.24
In the case of highways, private involvement may intensify siting
problems by increasing local concerns that the new highway will bring
too much new development. Private toll road proposals are often
motivated in part by the development prospects they offer and, as with
the Dulles Toll Road Extension, made financially possible by donations
of rights-of-way by the landowners who stand to gain. In the case of the
Dulles Toll Road, Loudoun County welcomes development, in part
because it still has not experienced either the benefits or the problems of
rapid growth of counties closer to Washington, D.C. But developer
interest and support of private road projects may only heighten fears of
development opponents in communities where too much development
has become an issue.
23 Whether the apprehension is warranted or not is difficult to say. On the one hand,
even one of the largest and most reputable private landfill operators, Browning-Ferris, has
been convicted of price fixing and fined for serious environmental violations. See Novack
(1988); Cook (1985). On the other hand, the private landfills are much more likely to be
equipped with liners, leachate collection systems and groundwater monitoring equipment
than their older public counterparts they may be replacing. The equipment may be better
in part because the average private landfill is newer than the average city or county landfill
and in part because state environmental inspectors may be tougher on private than public
operators. See Hamilton and Wasserstrom (n.d., especially p. 5).
24 Wheelabrator is gambling that the profit at the spot market rates will be higher on
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Finally, public agencies may have an advantage simply because
they have more established institutions and proceedings for dealing
with the types of equity issues involved in siting. The private sector,
almost by definition, has to rely on bargaining to reconcile conflicting
interests. Where the parties involved are very numerous or the conflict
is so polarized that mutual agreement seems difficult if not impossible,
public institutions, with their established procedures and authority,
may be quicker or their involvement unavoidable.
It would be difficult, therefore, to assess whether the involvement
of a private firm, on balance, reduces or increases the problems of siting.
Such a judgment probably varies according to the particular circum-
stances, such as the type of facility involved, the reputation of the
private firm and its skills at negotiation and compromise, and the
strength and nature of the local opposition. If private firms have an
advantage it is probably a modest one, however, and private ownership
per se probably will do little to overcome the serious obstacles to siting
new infrastructure facilities that exist in many communities. In those
cases where the siting disputes are so intolerable or complex that
government agencies must become deeply involved, moreover, some of
the private sector’s potential advantages in faster construction are likely
to be offset.
Pricing and Rate Regulation
A related issue in the privatization debate is whether private firms
are more likely to charge users of their facilities the socially appropriate
or desirable prices and, if not, whether public oversight or regulation of
their rates is required and what the consequences of that regulation
might be. Of course, user charges or prices, such as tolls or tipping fees,
are not the only potential revenue source to finance infrastructure
facilities. Revenues from ancillary activities are often used as well, such
as the sale of energy or recyclables from waste recovery plants or the
profit from the development of neighboring land parcels that a private
toll road company or its backers might own. Government revenues also
may be made available, including the proceeds from broad-based taxes
(for example property, income, or sales) or special taxes such as gasoline
excises or assessments on neighboring landowners.
A large literature is available on the circumstances in which user
charges, supplemented perhaps with ancillary revenues, are more
appropriate than general government revenues as the means for paying
for infrastructure or other public services. Most economists agree that
user charges are more appropriate when the users are the primary
beneficiary of the services provided by the facility; when the level of use
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charged affect the level of use; and when the administrative costs of
collecting the user charges are not too high.
All these conditions favorable to user charges seem to apply to solid
waste disposal and, with two important exceptions, to expressways as
well. One of these exceptions is that collecting tolls may be costly and
pose safety problems on some high-density urban expressways. The
other is what transport economists call the "two road problem": when
two parallel roadways are, from the motorist’s perspective, relatively
close substitutes for one another, the imposition of tolls on one road but
not the other can seriously distort the distribution of traffic between the
two facilities and cause undesirably high levels of congestion on the
untolled facility.25
Of course no theoretical or practical reason requires that the choice
of a private firm dictate the use of user charges or preclude government
tax revenues or subsidies. Private firms can build or operate facilities
under government contracts that provide for some or all of the costs to
be paid out of tax proceeds rather than user charges or ancillary
revenues (as the proposed Kansas City-Chicago toll road illustrates).
The interesting question is whether a private firm or a public agency is
the more likely to charge the appropriate or socially desirable prices in a
situation where both would rely on user charges and ancillary revenues
to the same degree.
~One argument in favor of the private firm is that it may be more
likely to price its services at marginal cost rather than at average or
historic costs. If the capacity of the existing facilities is limited, and new
facilities will cost more than the old ones, marginal costs may exceed
average or historic costs. Pricing at marginal cost sends signals to users
about the true cost of adding more capacity, and users, in turn, may
choose to change their behavior, for example, by recycling, using mass
transit, or carpooling. A potential political problem with marginal cost
pricing in such cases is that it will produce revenues in excess of the
costs of existing facilities. Public operators may be less willing or able to
produce such "windfall" profits for equity or legal reasons, despite the
fact that the pricing signals would, in the long run, produce more
efficient behavior on the part of users. Of course, public authorities may
also be reluctant to let private operators reap such windfalls and may
regulate rates to prevent their realization.
The private firm may have more incentive to apply marginal cost
pricing atomistically, moreover, so that fees for different types of users
2~ For a discussion of the "two road problem" theory see Meyer and Straszheim (1971,
pp. 44-59). For a discussion of the practical impact of this problem in Britain see Button
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are more closely aligned with the different costs they impose. A private
toll road operator might be more willing than his public counterpart to
charge peak-hour motorists more than off-peak motorists, for example,
much as private airlines charge travellers to Europe more during the
peak summer season than during the winter. Higher peak period
charges might be socially desirable because the peak-hour traveller may
be responsible for more of the capacity costs in the long run and (in the
absence of a surcharge) imposes socially undesirable congestion on
other roadway users in the short run. Similarly, a private waste disposal
firm might be motivated to charge tipping fees that varied with the
density or the combustibility of the refuse, if the disposal costs so varied.
In contrast, public authorities might be more inclined to charge different
users the same price because equal charges seem fairer at first glance
(ignoring the fact that different users may impose different costs) and
because a public agency may have less incentive than a for-profit firm to
distinguish between cheap and costly users.
The key potential disadvantage of a private firm is that it may be
more tempted than a public agency to exploit any monopoly or market
power it might enjoy by pricing its services well above costs. As long as
a market is competitive, of course, private firms cannot price above their
marginal costs in the long run; they may be able to do so in the short run
if demand temporarily outstrips supply, but only for as long as it takes
the industry to build additional capacity. If the market is not competi-
tive, however, a firm may be able to sustain prices in excess of marginal
costs even in the long run. As a consequence, some users could be
discouraged from using the facility even though they valued its use at
least as much as it would have cost to serve them.
A few states have decided to regulate the tipping fees or tolls charged
by private operators out of concern about such potential abuses of market
power. New Jersey is the only state that systematically regulates the
tipping fees of private waste disposal firms so far, although other states
have considered doing so. New Jersey imposed regulations because of
allegations that private waste carting companies were colluding to fix
prices, and tipping as well as transport fees were regulated because some
of the private companies owned disposal sites as well as carting companies.
The state is reportedly considering abandoning regulation of transport fees
because state price controls are perceived to have been so stringent that
they reduced the availability of carting services. New Jersey’s regulation of
tipping fees is likely to be maintained, however, because the number of
disposal sites in the state is so limited.26
26 Interview with Allen Blakey and Edward W. Repa, Director of Public Affairs and
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Private expressway tolls are perhaps more likely to be regulated,
although the experience to date is limited. Virginia’s 1988 law authoriz-
ing the construction of private toll roads specifies that the State Corpo-
ration Commission, which regulates public utility rates, will regulate the
tolls and rates of return on private roads as well, including those on the
proposed Dulles Toll Road Extension. California’s 1989 law authorizing
the construction of up to four private toll roads does not require that the
state regulate tolls. The California Department of Transportation plans
to approve only those projects where motorists have alternative routes,
however, and to review whether the rate of return generated by the
proposed toll is fair.27
As to whether concerns over market power are justified and
warrant public regulation of rates, the situation appears to vary slightly
between solid waste and toll roads. In the case of solid waste, more
reason exists to fear that private firms might enjoy and abuse market
power in the short run than the long run, but even in the short run,
regulation may be unwise. In the short run, the closing of many old
landfills and incinerators because of more stringent environmental
regulations and the difficulties in siting new facilities have greatly
constrained waste disposal capacity, particularly in the Northeast and
around major metropolitan areas. The tipping fees of $75 to $100 per ton
now charged in some areas are probably several times the cost of
operating a modern and environmentally responsible landfill and per-
haps as much as twice the cost of a new waste recovery plant (presum-
ing a new landfill or plant could be sited). In some areas, such as New
Jersey, Chicago, and Philadelphia, private waste disposal firms are
alleged to be using the shortage of disposal capacity not only to raise
tipping fees well above long-run disposal costs, but also to squeeze out
rival firms that are engaged in carting but do not own their own disposal
sites (Cook 1985, p. 130).
The ability of private waste disposal firms to maintain charges
above costs is probably very limited, however, especially in the long
run. Even in the short run, tipping fees are somewhat constrained by
the possibility of transporting wastes to more distant facilities. Transport
costs (of roughly one dollar per ton mile) are now comparatively small
relative to tipping fees in the Northeast, for example, which increases
the distance it is worthwhile to transport waste to enjoy a lower tipping
Management Association, Washington, D.C., April 20, 1990. Also see Hamilton and
Wasserstrom (n.d., pp. 11-12).
27 See "Private Roads Get Go-Ahead From California Government," Public Works
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fee.28 In the long run, high tipping fees will be further constrained by the
strong incentives they create to organize more effective waste recycling
programs and to overcome the opposition to the siting of new landfills
and waste recovery plants. Such considerations led the state of Minne-
sota to conclude that regulation of tipping fees was probably unneces-
sary, despite the fact that Browning-Ferris and Waste Management
together had a near monopoly on local private waste disposal facilities.29
Regulation of tipping fees may be unwise even in the short run,
moreover, simply because it might reduce the incentives to increase
long-run disposal capacity. It is hard to imagine that public or private
operators would ever overcome the present capacity constraints and
siting problems without the stimulus of the high profits some disposal
firms are now earning. Regulation of these profits might reduce the
incentives of private firms to find new sites, for example, or the
compensation they could offer to host communities.
The case for regulation of private toll roads is more complex because
of a possible trade-off between achieving financial feasibility and avoid-
ing excessive congestion on any parallel untolled facilities. The pro-
posed private DulIes Toll Road Extension will compete for traffic with
Virginia’s Route 7, a parallel highway that is untolled but not built to
expressway standards. Similarly, motorists could avoid the tolls on the
proposed Kansas City to Chicago private toll road by using one of two
slightly more circuitous and untolled routes: Interstates 70 and 53 (to the
south of the toll road) or Interstates 35 and 80 (to the north). Too many
parallel untolled or lightly tolled facilities can make toll operations both
financially infeasible and socially undesirable. On the one hand, it may
be difficult or impossible to collect tolls sufficient to finance a new road,
while on the other hand, high tolls might aggravate the "two road
problem" by keeping the level of congestion on the competing untolled
roadway too high.
The case for government control of private toll rates is therefore
strongest at either competitive .extreme. In the case of too little compe-
tition, it might take the form of conventional public utility rate regula-
tion such as is applied to local electric, gas or telephone rates. In the case
of too much competition, government regulation might take the form of
the imposition of tolls on the parallel public facility, with the public tolls
set at levels that make it possible for the private operator to charge rates
28 In the Northeast, however, long-distance transport usually means that garbage is
crossing state lines, which creates some difficult political problems.
29 Interview with Allen Blakey and Edward W. Repa. See also Hamilton and
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sufficient to earn a fair return and balance the allocation of traffic and
congestion between the two roads.
The decision as to whether government regulation of toll rates is
necessary will probably vary according to the particular circumstances.
In many cases it is possible that parallel roadways will provide just
enough competition to limit the market power of a private operator, but
not so much as to make toll operation unworkable. State governments
will probably feel obliged at least to review the competitive circum-
stances of each private toll road proposal before granting a franchise, as
California proposes, even if they do not require continuing public
regulation of rates during the operation of the facility, as Virginia has
done.
Government regulation of rates and returns to investors may reduce
the advantages of private ownership and operation by increasing delays
and other risks that investors face. Government review of the proposed
rates and returns during the initial franchise application may slow the
procurement process considerably and offset some of the potential
advantages that private operators may have in faster construction.
Virginia’s State Corporation Commission did not approve the initial
application of the backers of the Dulles Toll Road Extension, for
example, and has asked them to supply additional information about
their costs and proposed toll rates. Continuing regulatory review of
rates after the initial franchise is approved will provide an additional
element of risk for investors, moreover, for which they may require
higher rates of return as compensation.3°
Government regulation may also create incentives that reduce the
technical or cost efficiency of the firm. Regulatory economists have long
worried about regulatory authorities’ ability to set the appropriate rate of
return on investments when approving rates: too high a return can lead
to wasteful overinvestment or gold-plating of the facility, while too low
a return may lead to underinvestment. Setting the appropriate rate of
return involves difficult and controversial assessments of the nature and
degree of risks to which the investors are exposed.31
An Overall Assessment
Any overall public policy assessment of infrastructure privatization
must deal not only with efficiency issues but also with the questions of
3o Such a possibility is suggested, for example, by Kolbe and Tye (1990).
31 See Averch and Johnson (1962) and the reviews of the literature in Kahn (1988, vol.
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transfers and who wins and loses from privatization. The transfers of
costs from one party to another, which may not be too important from
the perspective of society as a whole, are obviously of great concern to
the parties involved. And knowing who captures any net efficiency
gains of privatization is obviously also important to the parties involved.
The actual incidence of gains and losses from privatization depends to a
considerable extent on the particulars of the individual cases. Only some
broad tendencies can be identified, and these only very tentatively.
Winners and Losers
The most likely losers from the privatization of a proposed facility
would seem to be organized labor and, to a lesser degree, landowners.
Labor will lose to the extent that private sector operation results in lower
wage rates or less protective workrules than public sector operation.
Landowners surrounding a private road may also lose if a private
operator is more successful than the public sector in extracting land
donations or other contributions to advance the enterprise. In both
cases, the losses come from the private sector’s greater incentives to seek
out and capture economic rents.32
The clearest winners from privatization would usually be federal,
state, and, in some cases, local taxpayers. Taxpayers potentially gain in
several ways. First, federal and state taxpayers usually would gain from
higher individual and corporate income tax payments made by the
private facility owners and bondholders, using taxable rather than
tax-free financing. If a state-owned facility were as efficient as a private
operation and set rates at the same level, for example, privatization
would transfer income from the state to the federal government because
the state-owned operation (and its surpluses) would have been tax-
exempt. Second, to the extent that private equity or debt replaces public
equity that received little or no return, the state or local taxpayers who
would have contributed that equity would gain from not having to make
that uncompensated contribution, while federal and state taxpayers
would gain from higher income tax payments on returns realized by the
private equity. Finally, state or local taxpayers might capture some of the
efficiency gains of private sector operation or the transfers of economic
rent from labor or landowners (particularly if the facility, though
privately owned or operated, could not be supported from user charges
32 Economic rents are payments or other benefits that owners of land, labor, or capital
receive that are in excess of those that would be required to induce them to supply those
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alone and the efficiency gains or transfers were used in part to reduce
the required government subsidies).
Investors might also gain from privatization of a proposed facility if
they were able to hold on to any of the economic rents (captured from
labor or landowners) or the efficiency gains from privatization, instead
of passing these on to facility users in the form of lower user charges or
better services. The prospects for doing so would depend on how
competitive the markets for the facility’s services were or, failing that;
how closely public regulators were able to monitor the private operator’s
costs and force them to price closely to their costs. In a competitive
market or under perfect regulation (a perhaps unattainable ideal), the
facility owners would be forced to pass these savings on to facility users
and earn only a normal return on their investment. With a less
competitive market and lenient regulation, the facility investors might
be able to earn above-market returns. (With excessively stringent
regulation the investors could lose by earning a below-market return in
the short run, but would eventually withdraw their capital by un~terin-
vesting or not maintaining the facility.)
Whether facility users would gain or lose depends on the particular
circumstances. Facility users might lose in two ways. First, if the
nominal costs of private sector financing were greater than the nominal
costs of public sector financing, the users are likely to bear the costs in
higher user charges. In effect, the users are likely to pay in higher tolls
or tipping fees for any gains taxpayers receive in higher income tax
payments or in avoiding uncompensated contributions of public equity.
Second, the users might lose if the private owners were more willing
and able to exploit any monopoly or market power by charging users
fees that exceeded the costs of building and operating the facilities.
Facility users stand to gain, however, to the extent they realize, in lower
fees, any transfers (from labor and landowners) or efficiency gains
generated by privatization. If the private owners are forced to pass these
savings on to facility users (by either competitive market or regulatory
pressures), these savings might offset the users’ other possible losses
and leave them, on net, better off.
The Importance of Efficiency Gains and Competition
This discussion of winners and losers strongly suggests that priva-
tization is a more attractive public policy where the potential efficiency
gains are great and the private operator faces effective competition. The
larger the efficiency gains from privatization, the greater the prospects
that most parties will gain from privatization and few will lose. The
prospect of greater efficiency gains may also mean less pressure to
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importantly, the larger the efficiency gains, the more likely that users
will be net beneficiaries. Competition is important, both because it
might help stimulate efficiency gains and because it will force investors
to pass any savings on to facility users rather than retaining them in the
form of above-normal returns.
Any assessment of the efficiency advantages of private provision of
infrastructure must balance a variety of conflicting considerations and
arguments. On the one hand, private firms probably have real cost
advantages in many cases in the form of economies of scale, scope, and
experience, in the incentives they can offer their employees and man-
agers to be more productive, and in faster procurement. Private firms
may also be better able to arrange the compensation needed to resolve
siting problems, as long as the disputes are not too complex, and are
more likely to tailor their prices to match the costs of different users. On
the other hand, government involvement in siting may be quicker or
even unavoidable where problems are complex and opponents intran-
sigent. The fear that private operators might abuse their monopoly
power also may be real enough to compel some form of public rate
regulation, particularly in the case of roads. Either type of government
involvement may undermine some of the normal cost advantages of the
private firm, particularly in speedier procurement, or add significantly
to other private sector costs by increasing investor risks or distorting
investment decisions.
In this light, the potential advantages of privatization are probably
greater in solid waste disposal than toll roads. In the case of solid waste,
the technological sophistication and complexity of modern disposal
facilities make the potential efficiency gains from both private construc-
tion and management large. Solid waste also raises fewer market power
or anti-competitive problems, especially in the long run. The emerging
practice of relying on the private sector to both build and operate
disposal facilities, either on a contract or merchant plant basis, reflects
these potential advantages.
In the case of roads, the largest or most obvious efficiency gains
would seem to lie in private construction rather than private operation
of the facility; however, the public sector probably already captures
many, or even most, of these construction economies through the near
universal practice of contracting with large and specialized private road
building companies for the construction of major public roads (although
they might do more, for example, by more closely emulating private
sector "fast-track" procurement practices). Private sector operation of
roads probably offers efficiency gains in some cases, but it may raise
troubling competitive issues as well. A lack of competition may make
private operation both less efficient (by constraining demand or reduc-
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more likely to be made worse off), while corrective government regula-
tion of rates may cause efficiency problems of its own.
Privatization and the "Infrastructure Crisis"
Finally, privatization, although often advantageous in other re-
spects, will probably do relatively little to alleviate the real or perceived
shortfall in infrastructure spending that has come to be known as the
"infrastructure crisis." Privatization alone will not increase the pool of
available capital for infrastructure spending as long as the public sector
also is willing to tap private capital markets, by issuing revenue or
general obligation bonds for similar facilities. The tapping of private
capital markets (whether by the private or public sector) is likely to come
at the cost of displacing other investments. By contrast, public funding
of infrastructure out of taxes (although politically more difficult) might
have a slightly greater chance of increasing aggregate investment (in
both infrastructure and other facilities) to the extent these taxes were
borne by consumption rather than savings.
Privatization also offers only moderate potential advantages in
siting facilities, which is probably as much of a constraint on infrastruc-
ture spending as the availability of capital. The private sector may be
able to arrange compensation more easily in some cases to overcome
siting opposition, but, rightly or wrongly, it may heighten fears in
others.
In sum, the limited experience thus far with privatization of waste
disposal and highways in the United States suggests that privatization
may be generally helpful but is no panacea. Some shortfalls in public
investment may be well suited to a privatization solution while others
may not be, with that suitability being very dependent on both the
competitiveness of the markets served and the realizable extent of any
efficiency gains.
Note: An earlier version of this paper was prepared with the support of a grant to the
Taubman Center for State and Local Government at the Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, an insurer of debt
securities. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of Financial Guaranty Insurance Company or the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.THE PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZING INFRASTRUCTURE 173
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Sir Alan A. Walters*
It is difficult to disagree with the main conclusions of Jose Gomez-
Ibanez, John Meyer, and David Luberoff. First, they conclude that
privatization is most attractive when the potential efficiency gains are
greatest and the private operator faces effective competition. Second,
they conclude that privatization, however advantageous, will do little to
alleviate the real or perceived shortfall in spending known as the
"infrastructure crisis."
Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff do not present an explicit
"model" of the infrastructure supply and demand process, or, more
pertinently, the privatization process and the public choice analysis. Yet
an implicit framework is developed within which the evaluation takes
place. They contend that private provision will be better than public
provision if
(1) Rapid technological progress takes place in the industry (and
their judgment is that more of such change is taking place in
solid waste disposal than in highways).
(2) Privately owned competitive firms are feasible as an alternative
to public sector provision (and again solid waste scores).
(3) "Depoliticization" of production activities is most likely under
private ownership.
A fourth possible addition would suggest that a powerful case for
privatization can be made if it were an effective way of reducing the
*Director, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc., and Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute.176 Sir Alan A. Waiters
overweening power of trades unions (and if that were the only way to
escape from the provisions of the Davis-Bacon condition).
New versus Existing Facilities
Of course, most privatization in the West as well as in the Third
World has been concerned with turning over existing state-owned assets
and liabilities to the private sector. Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff,
however, are primarily concerned with the creation of new assets, and
whether they are best financed, created, and owned by the private
rather than the public sector. For example, they do not consider, even
tangentially, the possibility of a complete privatization of the Interstate
Highway System. And although selling existing roads or bridges to the
private sector is discussed, this is clearly a marginal consideration.
Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff are probably being quite
realistic in eschewing the radical privatization solution. Political econ-
omy, like politics, is the art of the possible. (The contrast with Clifford
Winston’s paper is notable; Winston considers a radical rebuilding of
highways, but he does not discuss a feasible program and its costs and
benefits.) Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to have seen
their view on the efficacy of a completely privatized road system. Would
the standards of construction have been more efficient, would it have
been possible to avoid the vast waste of overbuilt roads in rural America
(the Ann Friedlaender thesis), would it have produced more urban
highways, would the operation be more efficient, would pricing be more
appropriate?--and so on.
Contractual Systems and Regulatory Systems
Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff refer obliquely to various
contractual arrangements but they do not discuss the vast variety of
contractual systems that may be generated under private ownership. In
solid waste disposal, one would expect to find many hedging arrange-
ments--forward markets, futures, and options would be developed,
operating (except for forward markets) with standardized contracts.
Why cannot solid waste disposal markets develop like the traditional
ones in commodities?
It is more difficult to see this developing in tolled facilities, yet the
development of pricing and supply contracts in electricity (Britain has
had a crash course in these matters) gives one pause before ruling it out.
The modern methods of electronic pricing provide a wealth of oppor-
tunities for auctions in road-use rights. In many circumstances, compet-DISCUSSION 177
itive supply, given the capital stock, is possible (such as on the four or
five roads between Washington and Baltimore).
In the absence of competition, Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff
suggest that, while fully recognizing the criticisms, the traditional rate of
return regulation be introduced. However, other methods are available
which are likely to be introduced in the United Kingdom. Misleadingly
called "price-cap" systems, they avoid at least some of the inefficiencies
of rate of return regulatory systems. (Note it is a cap on average revenues
per unit of output and it applies only over the part of the revenue with
some monopoly power.)
Macroeconomics
Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff make the curious claim that
while privately financed infrastructure is likely to displace some other
forms of private investment, publicly provided infrastructure, when
funded by user charges or taxes rather than debt, is likely to generate
additional savings. Thus a consequence of the increase in tax revenue
would be some reduction of private consumption, rather than a reduc-
tion of private (non-road) investment.1 I find it difficult to follow this
argument. The authors are holding real income fixed in this comparison.
Then, increasing taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis to finance the invest-
ment will be considered by the private sector as an expenditure
occurring today which, other things equal, will increase future dispos-
able income, compared with the alternative of paying the future interest
on debt incurred today. The form of finance will affect the timing of
savings, as people finance their chosen and unchanging consumption
stream. Total investment should not be affected.
Wages and Transfers
The authors are too dismissive of the effects of privatization (and,
one may add, deregulation and competition) in eliciting lower wage
levels, partly in lower wage costs per unit of output but also in lower real
wages per hour. They claim that these effects are simply transfers from
1 This, of course, denies the validity of the Ricardo equivalence theorem, where debt
finance, in contrast with current tax finance, would induce additional savings by
consumers to meet their future higher tax liabilities. No net effect on investment or capital
stock would occur. It must be noted, however, that because of the discrete generation
effect and the absence of perfect bequest motives, among other things, the Ricardo
proposition has not been supported by empirical enquiries.178 Sir Alan A. Waiters
one group (labor) to another (owners and customers). But if the excess
wage rate is due to monopoly power, whether formally or sanctioned by
government, a reduction of those rates to competitive levels is, at least,
an elimination of a distortion in the system and so will generate efficiency
gains as well as transfers. It will result in an increase in employment and
possibly a reduction in unemployment. Moreover, the process of
privatization will also reduce more serious distortions generally associ-
ated with high unionized wage rates, such as issues of manning,
seniority rules, work practices, and so forth.
Conclusion
On balance, one can find more achievable gains from privatization
of the highways than Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer, and Luberoff offer. The
only evidence as support, however, is anecdotal--such as the construc-
tion of Alliance Airport, the experience of the Channel Tunnel (com-
pared with, for example, the Thames Barrage), and the management
and maintenance of toll-ways. Clearly, more work needs to be done--
and the authors have provided a most useful initial framework.Gait D. Fosler*
Jose Gomez-Ibanez, John Meyer, and David Luberoff approach a
sometimes passionate topic with a remarkably dispassionate view. Their
paper provides a broad and extremely useful discussion of the advan-
tages and limitations of privatization, and it adds important perspectives
to the work of those who would advocate privatization as the solution to
America’s infrastructure problems.
Several important points in the paper should be emphasized. First,
the privatization discussion has more to do with efficiency, pricing,
technology, and shifting burdens among users, taxpayers, and wage
earners and among economic and financial sectors, than with the total
quantity of infrastructure. Privatization of some infrastructure services,
such as solid waste disposal, has increased over the past decade. Yet
infrastructure investment relative to GNP has shown little change or has
even declined. Given the requirements of technology and systems
management, the private sector can be an equal or even superior partner
in the provision of infrastructure. Nonetheless, Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer,
and Luberoff doan excellent job of identifying both the practical and the
theoretical limitations to the privatization of infrastructure investment.
The second point, implicit in the selection of toll roads and solid
waste disposal facilities as examples of privatization, is that privatization
of infrastructure investment and of public services generally has not
progressed very far. The paper cites the extensive privatization of solid
waste disposal capacity. However, this is more the exception than the
rule. The 4,128 miles of highly visible toll road projects represent only
*Chief Economist, The Conference Board.180 Gail D. Fosler
Table 1
Private Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1982 and 1988




Constant Dollar Gross Stock
Local & Interurban Passenger Transit 9.6 8.5 -11.5
Transportation by Air 73.0 69.2 -5,2
Transportation Services 34.5 35.4 2,6
Sanitary Services 18.2 25,1 37.9
Total 135.3 138.2 2,1
Constant Dollar Net Stock
Local & Interurban Passenger Transit 4,1 4,0 -2.4
Transportation by Air 39.8 34.0 - 14.6
Transportation Services 18.1 16.8 -7.2
Sanitary Services 10.5 14,6 39.0
Total 72.5 69.4 -4.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States,
1925-85 (June 1987), and the Bureau.
0.2 percent of total highway miles in America. In the states of Virginia
and California, toll roads account for less than 100 miles of highway. The
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
estimates that only 200 miles of toll roads will be built in the 1990s.
Similarly, privatization does not appear to be a major factor in water,
sewers, urban transportation, or education.
To be sure, it is difficult to get a good measure of private infrastruc-
ture investment or of the private investment share by type of infrastruc-
ture service. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis series on fixed
reproducible tangible wealth provides a hint of the limited private
involvement. The gross capital stock in local and interurban transpor-
tation, air transportation, sanitary services, and other transportation
services is virtually unchanged since 1982 at $135 billion to $138 billion
in constant dollars, and on a net stock basis it has declined. True,
investment in private sanitary services is up almost 40 percent in real
terms since 1982, but other types of private infrastructure investment are
down (Table 1).
These trends raise the question of why the United States is not
undertaking more of this investment if it is such a good idea, which
raises a third point in the paper. The incentives required for private
involvement in infrastructure activities appear from all indications to be
extremely high. To the extent the private sector requires incentives or
various forms of monopoly power, the efficiency gains from privatiza-
tion are limited.DISCUSSION 181
As the paper points out, the tax code before the 1986 reform
provided substantial incentives for privatization of water, sewer, and
solid waste disposal services. These incentives were justified on the
basis that private companies should enjoy the same financial advantages
that state and local governments have in the tax-exempt market. While
the total federal tax expenditures dedicated to this purpose were not
substantial, local bonds used for private purposes rose dramatically in
the mid-1980s. From 1975 to 1980, bond issuance for pollution control
averaged $2 billion to $3 billion. By 1984, with the explosion of private
purpose tax-exempt finance for pollution control, total issuance jumped
to over $8 billion. By 1986, the spread between tax-exempt bonds and
taxable Treasuries was less than 100 basis points.
In 1986, tax reform eliminated or substantially curtailed private
purpose tax-exempt financing. Last year, tax-exempt financing for
sewage disposal, solid waste, and non-nuclear hazardous waste was
only $1.9 billion, not very different from the amounts in the 1970s. The
former incentives were important primarily for pollution control, and
often served as a subsidy for private spending. Once these incentives
were removed, privatization of other services simply has not progressed
very far, even with the remaining incentives.
The experience (and incentives) in privatizing solid waste may
provide a key to "why." The publicly traded solid waste companies are
highly successful and highly profitable. The price-earnings ratios for
many of these companies are 50 percent above the market, because of
their spectacular profitability. The operating margin for the environmen-
tal industry is well over 20 percent, with a 12.5 percent return on capital.
Indeed, the companies with the highest price-earnings ratios are those
with near monopolies in waste handling and disposal.
In short, public infrastructure activities become private when they
are profitable. And, they are often profitable where they enjoy noncom-
petitive market advantages, either in terms of market area or landfill
capacity. Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that private services are
more efficient in terms of cost "as long as there is competition to make
sure that private operators remain efficient," as Gomez-Ibanez, Meyer,
and Luberoff state, some evidence suggests that the private companies
are successful precisely because they face limited competition and are
unregulated.
I would like to make one final point on the paper itself and then
conclude with some observations about the role of privatization in
public infrastructure. The paper does a very good job of introducing the
political problems associated with infrastructure spending. Problems
associated with siting are a key limitation, as are decisions regarding
who bears the cost burden. Local developers continue to press for
development rights in advance of adequate public facilities; waste182 Gail D. Fosler
disposal sites are huge local political issues; and local jurisdictions and
states often battle over who should bear the cost of schools, roads, and
other infrastructure. Indeed, a key question arises out of the siting
discussion: If we had all of the funding necessary to build infrastructure,
would the local politics of development and the environment permit it to
be spent? In many instances, the answer is undoubtedly no.
Observations on the Role of the Private Sector in the
Provision of Infrastructure
Along with the rapid growth in government in recent years comes
the increasingly popular notion that the private provision of public
services will substitute for the public provision of infrastructure and at
lower cost while, at the same time, creation of a private market for public
goods will somehow substitute for the political process. In a few
remarkable instances the privatization of infrastructure has met both of
these objectives; solid waste and toll roads are good examples. It is also
true that the debate over the privatization of infrastructure has spilled
over into human services, prisons, and more recently into education.
Nonetheless, the task of government is to determine which public
goods should be provided and then to determine what can be done
publicly and what can be done privately. With this said, it is equally
clear that whatever the outcome on the debate on its rate of return,
infrastructure spending, probably both for new construction and for
maintenance, will have to rise substantially; and it will have to rise in
areas in which neither the economics nor the political process will favor
private solutions.
A key private role, beyond the provision of the service, must
therefore be to help shape the political process in such ways that the
required levels of taxes and spending are forthcoming from the public
sector with the least distortions to the economy. This is proposed in
other papers at this conference. Moreover, whatever favor infrastructure
may find in the public process, it is also clear that the private sector--
both individual and business--will bear higher direct costs through
taxes and higher indirect costs through increased product prices for the
infrastructure needs, especially environmental needs, as a consequence
of public policies and regulations.